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The increasing number of free trade agreements involving both developed and developing countries 
has raised political and economical concerns, while increasing inconsistencies in international trade 
law. Non governmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements have strongly criticized these pro-
cesses as well as the existing unbalanced trade rules resulting from unbalanced power relations between 
developed, developing and less developed countries (LDCs). 
The acceleration of bilateral and regional initiatives pushes even further existing asymmetries in 
both political and economic leverage that different groupings of countries can exercise in the world econ-
omy, thus exacerbating existing national and international unbalances. 
Indeed, these processes are unbalanced in their nature as parties involved do not have the same 
leverage or political and economic influence in the world economy. The suspension of the WTO trade 
negotiations in July 2006 accelerated this trend, which was not reversed after the recommencement of 
multilateral talks in January 2007. 
Although the official discourse argues that regional and free trade agreements are stepping stones 
towards the objectives pursued in the Doha Development Round, in reality these initiatives create further 
constraints on developing countries’ capacity to exercise their sovereignty and policy making to promote 
socially and gender-sensitive strategies. 
Furthermore, these negotiations affect both directly and indirectly on-going negotiations in the con-
text of the Doha Development Agenda1. 
1 The existing WTO multilateral trading negotiations and rules have been extensively critized by the social movements and the 
NGOs, particularly with regard to the their implications on development policies and gender relations. This paper is not intended 
to focus on the multilateral trading sytsem but rather to highlight the incosistency and the strategies employed by major players to 
instill their interests in the multilateral arena through RTAs and FTAs. 
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They raise at least two questions: 
The first question relates to RTAs and FTAs’ push for the idea of trade as The Means for Development, 
while often linking trade to political and investment issues2. This trend towards further and faster liber-
alization can result in further undermining of developing and LDCs’ capacity to regulate and choose their 
development strategies. This is a political interference, through economic agreements. 
The second question regards the real impact of RTAs on developing and LDCs’ leverage in multilater-
al negotiations. One could wonder whether developed countries are now pursuing their interests through 
RTAs and FTAs because of emerging developing countries’ groupings and coalitions that are attempting 
to rebalance existing rules, power dynamics and agreements multilaterally. 
This evolution in the MTS might indeed be the reason why the stronger partners of the world economy 
prefer to make deals outside of this context. Indeed, this might be another strategy to divide developing 
countries’ coalitions by providing separate deals that might then be injected in the multilateral context 
with further strings attached. 
In relation to substance, issues of particular interest to developing and LDCs, such as subsidies in 
agriculture can only be dealt with multilaterally as their impact is spread worldwide, thus affecting world 
prices that undermine incomes of small agriculture producers, most of which are women. The same ar-
gument is evident in the area of TRIPs. However, the MTS has yet to provide real trade opportunities for 
developing countries, and to materialize its developmental promises. 
Developed WTO Members continue engaging in regional agreements that are often times not report-
ed to the WTO until concluded. Many times the content of such agreements remain unknown to third 
parties that might be affected by trade distortion and trade diversion measures. This does not foster 
transparency in the world trading system3. 
2 IGTN has published two papers related to these issues, available at: www.igtn.org/page/703, and www.igtn.org/page/732.
3 Another approach would consist of working towards tackling a number of structural unbalances that feed in the international trad-
ing rules and regulations. These are: First, the international division of labour, second the post-modern era of industrialization in 
developed countries that has as pendant de-industrialization of developing and LDCs, third unequal terms of trade, which are still 
fi xed independently from production and livelihood considerations. These issues are not tackled by the existing trade agreements, 
which tend rather to foster existing inequalities, unbalanced production systems and industrial relations both in industrialized, de-
veloping and LDCs. This paper will not tackle these issues. 
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II. Objectives
This study has the following main objectives: 
(i) Highlight systemic and legal issues that the move toward regionalism poses both from the point 
of view of consistency as well as from a developmental and gender-friendly perspective; 
(ii) Point out both systemic and rules-related dangers from a gender perspective. It is worth high-
lighting critical systemic and legal issues, while exemplifying political guidelines that underpin 
economic official discourse on development and integration of developing countries in the world 
trading system as a means for development;
(iii) Expose main policy guidelines on free trade initiatives of the European Communities (EC4) and 
the United States (US). 
4 For legal reasons, in the WTO the European Union is known offi cially as the European Communities. The EU is a WTO member in 
its own right as are each of its 27 member States, making 28 WTO members altogether. While the member States coordinate their 
position in Brussels and Geneva, the European Commission alone speaks for the EU and its members at almost all WTO meetings 
and in almost all WTO affairs. For this reason, in most issues, WTO materials refer to the “EU”, or the legally-offi cial “EC”. However, 
sometimes references are made to the specifi c member States, particularly where their laws differ. This is the case in some disputes 
when an EU member’s law or measure is cited, or in notifi cations of EU member countries’ laws, such as in intellectual property 
(TRIPS). Individual EU members speak in committee meetings or sponsor papers, particularly in the Budget, Finance and Administra-
tion Committee. This situation creates a legal and institutional controversy related to democratic control of decisions taken by the 
European Commission in the area of trade policy. Sometimes individuals’ nationalities are identifi ed, for example the nationalities of 
WTO committee chairpersons. Available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm. 
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III. Methodology 
This study’s analysis will focus on the interregional agreements as promoted by the two major eco-
nomic powers in the global economy, the EU and the US. 
This choice is justified by the empirical observation of dynamics and official discourses on the rea-
sons and the objectives of interregional integration in the context of the multilateral trading system as 
well as by the need to question such official reasons for promoting North-South interregional trade agree-
ments. 
In our view, this trend responds again to an attempt to expand geopolitical influence in the different 
regions. It does not tackle developmental issues in the multilateral trading system, while pushing even 
further the idea of Trade as The Tool for Development through market opening. 
This methodological choice is based on the fact that interregional and free trade agreements (defi-
nitions are provided in section V) are mostly WTO plus5 and tend to link economic and trade to political 
cooperation. 
In spite of some attempts towards the integration of people, particularly in Latin America, regional 
integration initiatives push the WTO neo-liberal economic scheme of trade liberalization even further as 
a means for development. 
This approach has been constantly criticized by civil society and social movements6. 
5 They include commitments that go further than trade rules as existing in the international trade Agreements, while creating parallel 
Dispute Settlement Systems for exemple on Investment. 
6 Further information on these critics is available at: www.igtn.org.
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IV. Structure 
This study will be strutured around the following sections. 
(i) Definitions   
(ii) Political issues 
(iii)  Issues regarding sectors
(iv) Political and Trade Guidelines of the EU and the US 
(v) What are the implications from a gender perspective? 
(vi) Conclusions. 
Annexes 1 and 2 are to provide an indicative list of the types of agreements and sectors covered by 
existing agreements or agreements that are under negotiation. 
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V. Defi nitions 
Before entering in the core of our analyisis, it is worth recalling the economic definitions7 of terms 
used in this paper: 
(i) A Free Trade Agreement is defined as a contractual arrangment between two or more countries 
under which they give each other preferential market access, including for sensitive products;
(ii) A Custom Union is defined as an international association organized to eliminate customs re-
strictions on goods between its member nations, and to establish a uniform tariff policy toward 
non member nations;
(iii) The pure interregionalism: links two free trade areas or two custom unions, i.e. the EU-MERCO-
SUR; 
(iv) The hybrid interregionalism: links a custom union and a group which is neither a free trade area 
nor a custom union, i.e., the EPAs between the EU and the ACP countries.
7 Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, Walter Goode, Centre for International Studies, University of Adelaide, 1998.
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VI. Political Issues 
On one hand, the proliferation of interregional and free trade agreements raises concerns with re-
gard to the inconsistencies that they create at the international level. On the other hand, concerns are 
geared towards the weaking of political leverage of weaker parties, including developing countries and 
LDCs. 
The following issues are worth highlighting when analyzing the implications of asymetrical RTAs: 
(i) The creation of self-contained regional legal frameworks within RTAs likely leads to a progressive 
erosion of the negotiating scope for solving development-related aspects of the Doha Development 
Agenda. They further weaken developing and LDCs’ efforts to rebalance existing unbalanced 
international trade rules;
(ii) RTAs result in different approaches to trade, and in a great heterogeneity and inconsistence at 
the national policy level. This further endangers the sovereignty exercise of developing coun-
tries and LDCs in choosing their own economic and social policies; 
(iii) The use of competition or anti-trust policy measures in RTAs intra-trade, in cases where anti-dump-
ing measures would apply to third parties, creates a dual system (of anti-dumping duties for third 
parties and of competition policy among RTA parties). These rules distort trade where different 
criteria and conditions apply to the invocation of anti-dumping and competition policies and mea-
sures. This undermines developing and LDCs’ efforts to renegotiate fairer rules on dumping under 
Article VI of the GATT. Anti-dumping measures are a controvertial issue in the context of the Doha 
Development Agenda, and are under negotiation as part of the single undertaking; 
(iv) Contingency protection instruments8, technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures increase as a result of RTAs, particularly in regard to their potential impact on 
8 WT/REG/W/26, Annex VI, paras. 39-53.
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third-party trade. Indeed, as in many cases, conditionalities are put forward before signing these 
agreements, thus limiting the weaker party’s capacity to export; 
(v) Notification is also a systemic and political issue. At which point in time, should an RTA be noti-
fied to inform third parties of their content and implications? A number of RTAs and FTAs cur-
rently in force have not been notified. This situation could be cited as hindering any comprehen-
sive and precise evaluation of the RTAs implications and impacts; 
(vi) Dispute settlement provisions contained in the new generation of RTAs, could build jurispru-
dence conflicting with existing international rules, while putting governments in developing 
countries and LDCs at the mercy of international corporations that can launch complaints 
against local authorities. This is an aberration that must be stopped. 
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VII. Sectoral Issues 
These agreements also raise a number of issues in relation to sectors9. They are the following: 
(vii) Agriculture: RTAs raise the question of the vacuum left by the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
with regard to reduction of domestic support and export subsidies in the context of RTA. Pro-
liferation of RTAs could provide a window to escape from the debate of domestic support and 
export subsidies that are now under negotiation in the Doha Development Round. This is a key 
issue for development, and is also the most controversial as developed countries are meeting 
expectations of developing and LDCs with regard to reduction of domestic support and export 
subsidies that undermine their capacity to export; 
(viii) Rules of Origin: The Agreement on Rules of Origin does not contain disciplines on non-preferential 
rules of origin. Apart from the Common Declaration with Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin, 
annexed to the agreement10, no guidline agreed upon multilaterally. 
(ix) GATS: RTAs can allow derogation from transparency, fair administration of domestic regula-
tions and emergency safeguards. They can push further the liberalization of public services 
through the opening of local service providers with foreign service providers. 
9 These are as identifi ed in the document: WT/REG/W/26, Annex VI, paras. 39-53.
10 The preamble to the Agreement recognizes that clear and predictable rules of origin and their application facilitates the fl ow of 
international trade, and states the desirability that rules of origin themselves do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. The 
Common Declaration provides disciplines for preferential rules of origin; in particular, Article 3(c) requires that laws and regulations 
relating to them be published “as if they were subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Article X of GATT 1994”.
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VIII. Political and Trade Guidelines 
of the EC11 and the US
(A) THE EC´S POLITICAL AND TRADE GUIDELINES 
The EU’s actions and political positioning with regard to trade policy result from a variety of factors 
that range from its institutional framework and the influence of different interest groups related to dif-
ferent countries as well as by political factors. Such factors include the influence of Europe in the inter-
national arena and the construction of the European regional identity through regional agreements. 
The EU has used trade policy as an instrument of its foreign policy, to ensure regional stability, and 
to further its political influence throughout the world. In 2005, the Lisbon strategy sets out steps that the 
Commission deems as fundamental to deliver growth and jobs, including the need to ensure open markets 
around the world12. The internal and the external agenda are complementary. In this perspective, the neo-
liberal credo of market opening is a means to both internal and external welfare. 
On the assumption that globalization collapses distinction between the domestic and international 
policies13, the Commission has chosen trade policy as a means to contribute to its external goals, in par-
ticular in development and neighbourhood policy objectives. 
In this perspective, the Commission identifies as key economic criteria for FTAs and RTAs with third 
parties: (i) market potential (size and growth); (ii) level of protection against EU export interests (tariff 
and non tariff barriers). 
11  The legal authority in trade negotiations for the EU is the Commission as mandated by the Treaty of the European Community, 
signed in Rome in 1957 in its Article 133, which creates a Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Member countries shifted their 
competence to negotiate external commercial agreements, and bound themselves to seek changes in these policies through the 
Council of Ministers or the Commission. However, this article has to be read in connection with Articles 177 and 181 related to 
development issues, Article 300 that sets rules on cooperation and association agreements, and Article 310 that regulates recipro-
cal agreements to be negotiated by the Commission.  
12  Global Europe, Competing Around the World, A contribution to the EU’s growth and Jobs Strategy, European Commission, Exter-
nal Trade, April 2007. 
13 Ibid.
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Negotiations with MERCOSUR, ASEAN and South Korea are based on these principles (see Annex 1 
on details and status of these negotiations). 
The EU’s rules and procedures make its trade policy complex, while dut to institutional and political 
overlapping that flaws some of its external trade negotiations. The least common denominator resulting 
from internal bargaining among the 27 member states limits the EC positioning in trade negotiations 
both at regional and multilateral levels. 
The EU has been using RTAs in order to improve and maintain its market share in developing coun-
tries’ markets. 
Economic official considerations can be distinguished in three types: (i) restoring a level playing field 
and neutralizing trade diversions suffered as consequence of other RTAs; (ii) Strategic links with emerg-
ing markets; (iii) Enforcing existing international trade rules. Beyond these official objectives, however, 
the Commission has been pursuing political influence and expansion of its development model. 
(B) THE US’S POLITICAL AND TRADE GUIDELINES 
The US’s interest in entering into free trade agreements with developing countries can mainly be 
explained by its desire to achieve multilateral economic objectives through regional integration, while 
pursuing further market access objectives. This is consistent with its belief in economic liberalism as a 
means for development. 
To achieve its objectives, the US adopted a three dimensional trade strategy, which sees bilateral, 
regional and multilateral talks as interrelated and mutually supportive. Thus, promoting convergence of 
interests in more open trade, while ensuring that RTAs partners have areas of common interest that they 
should want to further liberalize at the multilateral level. 
We bare in mind the Geopolitical and security considerations are to be recalled with regard to agree-
ments with the Middle East nations. Trade agreements with these countries are seen as a vehicle for 
deepening political relationships. Bilateral fast-track authority, as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act 
of 1984, requires US potential partner to request free trade negotiations. 
The US has established criteria to be used when entering RTAs, such as14: 
(i) Will the FTA help broaden support for US trade initiatives among members of Congress and pri-
vate-sector interest groups? 
(ii) Will the FTAs promote US economic interests?
(iii) Is the prospective FTA partner ready?
(iv) Will the FTA promote US foreign policy objectives?
14  Schott, J. J., (2004), “Free trade agreements: US strategies and priorities”, Washington, D.C. Institute for International Economy, 
pp. 365-369. 
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This first question is related to “the political filter that targets members,” and directs its focus on 
whether any new FTA will help to broaden support for US trade initiatives among members of Congress 
and private-sector interest groups. 
The second question relates to investment interests of US businesses and exporting companies. The 
third question considers the willingness and ability of developing country partners to: (i) change its poli-
cies to meet the requirements of reciprocal free trade pacts that usually go beyond their respective WTO 
commitments; and (ii) work cooperatively with the US negotiators to pursue positive results in WTO ne-
gotiations. The fourth question concerns democratic governance and political relations between those 
countries. 
These are not development actions for developing countries or LDCs, but rather a boost for European 
or American businesses. The objective of creating new markets must be kept in mind when assessing 
these agreements. 
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IX. What are the implications 
from a gender perspective? 
From a systemic and political point of view, RTA and FTA initiatives have implications for women. 
The following reasons are mainly systemic. 
(i) Interregional and bilateral initiatives often go beyond the WTO commitments. In this respect, it 
is worth highlighting the danger of the top-down, or the negative list approach that is adopted in 
RTAs and that differs from the GATS positive list; 
(ii) The negative list approach demands developing and LDCs to have a greater national assessment 
capacity and regulatory framework to be aware of which specific sectors are not to be liberalized. 
This approach is very dangerous for developing and LDCs that lack capacity to forecast conse-
quences of unilateral liberalization of services including public services that are of particular 
relevance to women. Thus, these actions endanger even further women’s access to basic services, 
while jeopardizing their livelihoods; 
(iii) Interregional initiatives reflect unbalanced relations of power. As the two major trading actors 
in today’s economy, the EC and the US respond to their own business and interest groups’ prerog-
atives, namely transnational corporations. These actors push their government representatives 
to pressure their developing country partners into entering in burdensome agreements, while 
promoting further trade liberalization. This is particularly true in relation to investment and 
competition-related disciplines (not in the WTO rules) as well as Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) and contingency and environmental protection;
(iv) Protection of traditional knowledge and national infant industries is fundamental in provid-
ing a chance to developing countries’ industrial and employment promotion, while providing a 
chance for women’s stable and sustainable incomes as well as local traditional knowledge;
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(v) Interregional and bilateral initiatives increase the incoherent developmental discourses and ac-
tions as promoted by developed countries15 in terms of global governance. Thus, undermining 
further the prospects for economic and social development in developing countries linked to 
lack of coherence in development discourses. In the case, for example, of rules of origins, a coun-
try may have to apply different sets of rules when determining how to classify the origin of goods 
being traded, depending on the specific RTAs it belongs to;
 The plethora of interregional and bilateral initiatives replicates the political use of trade policy 
as an instrument for development and job creation as well as a social catalyst. This consequently 
undermines any alternatives in policy choices making. It does not respond to a real regional 
integration effort towards the integration of the peoples and cultures. They are underpinned by 
the usual logic of the business corporations and only strict business vision of adapting interna-
tional, regional and national rules to the profit-making perspective and deeper market;
(vi)  The push towards foreign direct investment and the consumerism model often without the ap-
propriate regulatory framework in the receiving countries has, in most cases, contributed to 
the weakening of national policy-making and to the lack of social consultation to guarantee eq-
uitable distribution of gains deriving from such investment. Thus, these actions reinforce the 
existing international division of labor;
(vii) Solve the dilemma of how to reconcile a gender and socially sensitive development for all. Most 
of these initiatives push towards a quicker and deeper liberalization that only takes into account 
the needs of a wealthy minority.
From the point of view of sectors, RTAs and FTAs initiatives raise a number of issues that negatively 
impact both gender-sensitive development and developing countries’ policy space. 
(i) Reduction of commitments on domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture are the cen-
tral pillar of the WTO Doha Development Round, and are highly controversial between developed 
and developing countries. The existing legal vacuum could profit to developed countries that are 
part of a Custom Union to escape WTO commitments, while weakening developing country coali-
tions in this area. Thus further endangering female small farms livelihoods in most developing 
countries;
(ii) The following issues are central to LDCs policy making: GATS, MFN departures, fair administra-
tion of domestic regulation and emergency safeguards and existing conflicts between national, 
regional and international rules related to modes of supply as subject to the GATS disciplines. 
These issues are central to developing countries’ policy space. Indeed, the issue of services sup-
15 See IGTN Paper on Global Governance, International Development Discourses and National Policy-Making: Highlight of Critical Is-
sues. Available at: www.igtn.org.
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plied under government authority (Article I:3) of the GATS is fundamental as it affects services 
of public interests, such as transport, education and health. They play a central role in human 
development capital in developing countries, including women’s quality of life throughout de-
veloping countries. Unfair administration of domestic regulations can be detrimental to efforts 
made in the multilateral system to improve implementation of Mode 4 , thus undermining even 
further the possibility of remittances in developing countries. 
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X. Conclusions
The suspension of the Doha Round in July of 2006 marked a point of crisis in multilateral trade ne-
gotiations. This raised a number of systemic and implementation issues related to its effectiveness in 
responding to development needs as expressed and negotiated by its developing country-members in the 
context of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)16. 
This trend can best be explained by the following factors: 
(i) The emergence of developing countries’ coalitions, including the G33 and negotiating positions 
that clearly advocate for the rebalancing of the MTS’ decision-making process as well as of the 
existing trade rules; 
(ii) Under influence from the business community, governments have developed the belief that re-
gionally negotiated cycles correspond more to the quick product cycles as they can be agreed 
upon in a shorter time frame. In this perspective, the two big blocks push for quicker and more 
efficient agreements to be negotiated regionally with fewer or even one country; 
(iii) The there exists the fear of the economic powers to loose of losing market opportunities and 
shares in emerging developing countries. This trend is determined by the specific export-ori-
ented interest groups that advocate for regional agreements; 
(iv) The desire by economic powers to use regional agreements as political and economic tools to 
promote national reforms in developing countries towards trade liberalization. 
The MTS will have to face questions related to its adequacy in response to the challenges of develop-
ment and existing inequalities, including the impact of trade rules on national policy-making and equal 
treatment. 
16  Further information on the Doha Develoment Agenda and the on-going negotiations is available at: www.igtn.org. 
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Although they involve a limited number of countries compared to multilateral agreements, regional 
and free trade agreements and initiatives remain international agreements. In this sense, they pose a 
number of systemic and coherence issues. 
In our view, from a political perspective, this represents, a turning point in the WTO systemic ap-
proach. Indeed, since the GATT the main emphasis of the world trading system has been on increasing 
market access through liberalization of trade. 
Since 2001, development-related issues have gained more attention in relation to trade negotiations 
thanks to strategic alliances among developing countries and global social movements. Over time, indeed 
the social movements as well as civil society have influenced the trade negotiating agenda 
This systemic evolution poses a question related to the existing WTO agreements as well as to the 
functionality of the multilateral trade negotiations: how can its Members reconcile the traditional mar-
ket access approach with the stronger development needs approach? 
The proliferation of interregional trade agreements, particularly between the North and the South, 
puts in question the existing decision-making and agenda of the MTS. Indeed, the underpinning prin-
ciples of the multilateral trading system operate in a context of asymmetrical means and possibilities of 
its Members. 
It is therefore important to tackle some of the following issues (i) scope and impact of trade agree-
ments; (ii) inclusiveness and transparency of its decision-making; (iii) impact of existing and forthcom-
ing trade rules on existing asymmetries and inequalities both at the global and national levels. 
Development related rules and issues have been eroded over time by the push towards the generaliza-
tion of the MFN principle even to countries that do not have the necessary regulatory capacities, and nor 
the necessary level of development. 
If negotiations are slow, it is probably because as never before Members do have a chance to rebal-
ance international inequalities resulting from the international division of labor, unbalanced interna-
tional trade rules, and inconsistent development discourses. 
The time has nevertheless come to put development at the forefront of the WTO trade negotiations 
so as to avoid that developing countries are further caught into even more burdensome agreements than 
those they are attempting to rebalance in the context of the DDA. 
This is the challenge that will determine the relevance of the multilateral trading system in the global 
policy-making arena in the coming years.
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* This is an indicative list that might not be exhaustive, and that would need regular updating. Information provided in this table are taken 
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Annex 1*
List of EC Free Trade Initiatives
Agreements into Force
Parties involved Chile Mexico South Africa





Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA).
Date of Entry into Force 01.02.03 01.07.00
The TDCA was signed on 11 October 1999 and 
has been in force, provisionally and partially, 




Duty elimination with 
transitional period 
of 0, 4, 7, 10 years. 
Products covered by 
denominations in the 
EU (wine, cheese, etc.) 
are excluded from 
liberalization.
Tariff rate quotas: 




clause may be applied in 
case of emergency.
Agriculture will be 
liberalized by 2010, 80% 
of EU imports and 42% of 
Mexico’s imports. 
Fishery liberalized 100% 
of EU’ imports and 89% 
EU imports%.
The agreements contains 
tariff quotas for certain 
agriculture products that 
are not subject to full 
liberalization, as well as 
review clauses for further 
liberalization.
Agriculture to be liberalized within twelve 
years on the side of South Africa and ten 
years on the side of the EU. The reduction 
duties take place in six different reduction 
schemes in the case of the EU, and four 
reduction schemes in the case of South 
Africa. Duties on the more sensitive products 
are liberalized either partially or more slowly.
Tariff rate quota concessions are 
implemented for some of the products that 
are excluded from the overall liberalization 
process. 
Specific agricultural safeguard clauses 
emphasize the sensitivity of agricultural 
markets and the right to take provisional 
measures in exceptional circumstances;
Products whose denomination is 




Trade in goods is 
underpinned by 
transparent and 
strong rules, including 
provisions which aim 
at faciliating trade 
in particular in the 
area of wines and 








Liberalization of 100% 
of trade in industrial 
goods (by 112003 on the 
EU side and, by 112007 on 
Mexico’s side).
Mexico obtained 
preferential access for 
82% of industrial goods 
since July 2000 and by 
January 2003 for the other 
18%.







Confirms the principle 




Covers all sectors 
and contains 
commitment to further 
liberalization; 
The provisions related 
to Telecommunications 






of information and 
technical assistance
Liberalization took 
place in two phases: 
1) since the entry into 
force of the agreement 
a stand still clause have 
prevented both parties 
from introducing new 
discriminatory measures 
or reinforcing the existing 
one;
After three years from 
entry into force of 
the agreement, the 
parties agreed on a 
scheduled elimination 
of the remaining 
discriminations within a 
maximum period of ten 
years;
Coverage of trade in services is limited 
to three articles which confirm the 
commitments undertaken under the GATS;
Confirmed also is the commitments of both 
parties to the GATS fourth Protocol on basic 
Telecommunications and GATS fifth protocol 
on Financial Services;
Vague reference to further liberalization but 




Liberalization of investment and 
capital flows, protection of IPRs in 
conformity with TRIPs.
Confirmation of commitment to TRIPs and 
the existing international conventions. 
Mechanism to ensure cooperation. 
Completion of the undertakings already made 
by both Parties at the OECD and through 
bilateral Agreements signed between Mexico 
and most of the Member States.
Elimination of restrictions on payments 
related to investment; 
Review within 3 years to explore possibilities 
of further liberalization.
Other provisions
Built-in agenda securing the 
evolution of trade provisions. 
Numerous chapters provide for 
concrete actions to be taken, 
including review in the future of the 
situation with a view to even further 
deepen the level of preferences 
granted under the agreement.
Additional Agreement 
on automotive, on 
Trade in Spirits and 








Trade in goods including 
aspects of trade and 
investment.
Negotiations formally 
launched at EU-China 
Summit, September 2006 
No meeting has been scheduled 
yet. Negotiation modalities still 
to be agreed upon. 
Yet to enter into Force
Parties involved Euro-Med: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia.
Name of the Agreement The Euro- Mediterranean Agreements
Date of Entry into Force By 2010
Sectors
Trade in Agriculture
In general, agricultural liberalization is still limited compared to that of industrial products;
Numerous exceptions and advanced concessions are strictly defined for single products and 
countries;
Specific rules of origin for agricultural products ensure the exclusive application of preferences only 
on FTA members.
Trade in Goods 
Trade in Services 
General trend towards liberalizing trade in services;
Observance of GATS Art. V:1 (a) which requires further liberalization
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* The GCC was established in 1981 by six countries, namely: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.
**  Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay









Possible coverage and 
objectives







In 1991 the Council 
of the EU adopted a 
negotiating mandate 
setting for a FTA. A 
new mandate was 
adopted ten years 
later which extended 
the scope of the 
negotiations
Liberalization of trade 





No target date has 
been set for the 
establishment of 
the FTA
The EU’s interests 
in the area are not 
simply commercial 




suppliers and the 







Negotiating began in 
2000
WTO-plus covering all 
the most important 




rounds, the parties 
failed the crucial 
request and offer 




for the EU 
MERCOSUR FTA 















1st phase “all ACP” 
launched on 27 
September 2002. 
2nd phase “regional 
negotiations” began 
in October 2003. 
North-South RTAs 
which provide gradual 
openness of ACP markets 
to the goods and services 
coming from the EU. 
Other objectives are 
i) fostering regional 
integration among ACP 
countries, ii) establishing 
simple and transparent 
rules for doing business. 
Negotiations to 
be concluded by 
December 2007. 
A framework on 
trade in goods will 








The partnership foresees 
a gradual deepening 
of the cooperation 
among the two blocs 




standards, sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards, 
custom procedures, 
IPRs, Tourism, trade 
and environment and 
forestry products.
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Andean Community Association Agreement under consideration. 
Central America
In 2006 the EC proposed negotiations directives for an Association Agreement. Negotiations started 
mid-2007.
India In December 2006 the EC requested negotiation for a FTA. Agreement to be concluded in 2009. 
South Korea In December 2006 the EC requested negotiation for a FTA. Expected to be completed in 2008. 
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Annex 2*
List of US Free Trade Initiatives
* This is an indicative list that might not be exhaustive, and that would need regular updating: This table is based on data collected 
before June 2007. Information provided in this table are taken from the website of the USTR
Agreements into Force 
Parties involved Chile Jordan Morocco
Name of the 
Agreement
US-Chile Free Trade Agreement US-Jordan US-Morocco
Date of the entry 
into force 




More than three-quarters of U.S. farm 
goods will enter Chile duty-free within 4 
years and all duties on US products will be 
phased out over 12 years. US access to Chile 
is as good as or better than the European 
Union or Canada, both of which also have 
FTAs with Chile.
Chilean price bands will be phased out. 
Eliminates the use of export subsidies 
on US-Chilean farm trade, but preserves 
the right to respond if third countries use 
export subsidies to displace US products 
in the Chilean market. An agricultural 
safeguard provision helps protect US 
farmers and ranchers from sudden surges 
in imports from Chile.
Both parties renewed their commitment to 
continue the work on resolving important 










agreed upon in 
the respective 
schedules;
Moroccan Commitments on Market Access: 
Morocco will provide preferential market 
access on all agricultural products according to 
schedules negotiated on a product-specific basis. 
Preferential tariff phase-outs on most products 
will occur in equal annual installments over the 
following phase-out periods: immediate, five 
years, eight years, ten years, 12 years, 15 years, 
and 18 years.
Tariffs on other products will be phased out 
using non-linear formulas applied over six years, 
18 years, 19 years and 25 years. 
US Commitments on Market Access:The United 
States will provide preferential market access 
on all agricultural products according to specific 
schedules negotiated on a product-specific basis. 
Preferential tariff phase-outs will be immediate, 
five years, eight years, ten years, 12 years, 15 
years, and 18 years. Except for products in the 
18-year period, US tariffs will be reduced in equal 
annual installments over the phase-out period. 
Export subsidies. The United States and 
Morocco have agreed to not use agricultural 
export subsidies in each other’s markets, 
unless the exporter believes that a third 
country is subsidizing its exports into the other 
FTA country’s market. In such cases, special 
provisions provide for measures to counter the 
third country’s subsidies.
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Sanitary and phytosanitary measures. under 
the agreement, the United States and Morocco 
affirm their existing rights and obligations 
under the WTO SPS agreement. In addition, 
they forego recourse to the agreement’s dispute 
settlement procedures for any SPS issues arising 
under the SPS Section of the agriculture chapter, 
and affirm their desire to create a forum on SPS 
matters through the Joint Committee..
Trade in goods
More than 85% of bilateral trade in 
consumer and industrial products became 
duty-free immediately upon entry into force 
of the agreement, with most remaining 
tariffs eliminated within four years.
Key US export sectors gain immediate 
duty-free access to Chile, such as 
agricultural and construction equipment, 
autos and auto parts, computers and other 
information technology products, medical 
equipment, and paper products.
Chile’s “luxury tax” on automobiles will 
be phased out in 2008. In the meantime, 
the number of vehicles to which this tax 
applies was sharply reduced as soon as the 
Agreement took effect.
Immediate duty-free is provided for 
textiles and apparel if they meet the 
Agreement’s rule of origin. A limited yearly 
amount of textiles and apparel containing 
non-US or non-Chilean yarns, fibers or 
fabrics may also qualify for duty-free 
treatment.
Elimination 








More than 95% of bilateral trade in consumer 
and industrial products will become duty-
free immediately upon entry into force of the 
agreement, with all remaining tariffs to be 
eliminated within nine years.
Key US export sectors gained immediate duty-
free access to Morocco, such as information 
technologies, machinery, construction 
equipment and chemicals. Textiles and 
apparel trade are duty-free if imports meet the 
agreement’s rule of origin. 
Trade in 
Services
Chile undertook market access 
commitments across a range of sectors. 
Traditional market access to services 
is supplemented by strong and detailed 
disciplines on regulatory transparency. 
Regulatory authorities must use open and 
transparent administrative procedures, 
consult with interested parties before 
issuing regulations, provide advance 
notice and comment periods for proposed 
rules, and publish all regulations.
The “Financial Services” chapter includes 
core obligations of non-discrimination, 
most-favored nation treatment, and 
additional market access obligations. 
US insurance firms have full rights to 
establish subsidiaries or joint ventures 
for all insurance sectors with limited 
exceptions. A new principle of expedited 
availability of insurance services means 
that prior regulatory product approval 
is not required for insurance sold to 
the business community. Expedited 
procedures are available in other cases 
when prior product approval is necessary.
Key services sectors covered by the agreement 
include audio-visual, express delivery, 
telecommunications, computer and related 
services, distribution, construction and 
engineering. 
Liberalization in trade services include banks, 
insurance, security and related services. 
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US banks and security firms may establish 
branches and subsidiaries may invest in 
local firms without restriction, except in 
very limited circumstances
Investment
The agreement establishes a secure, 
predictable legal framework for US 
investors operating in Chile.
All forms of investment are protected 
under the agreement.
US investors enjoy, in almost all 
circumstances, the right to establish, 
acquire and operate investments in Chile 
on an equal footing with Chilean investors.
The right to receive a fair market value for 
property in the event of an expropriation.
The agreement prohibits and removes 
certain restrictions on US investors, such 
as requirements to buy Chilean rather than 
US inputs.
These investor rights are backed by an 
effective, impartial procedure for dispute 
settlement that is fully transparent. 
Each government commits to apply fair 
procedures in administrative proceedings 
covering trade and investment directly affecting 
companies from the other country. 
 
Both governments must ensure that traders 
and investors from the other country can obtain 
prompt and fair review of final administrative 
decisions affecting their interests. 
IPRs
The US-Chile agreement contains IPR 






that go beyond 
the TRIPs 
agreement. 
The US-Morocco Agreement contains IPRs 
provisions that go beyond the TRIPs agreement.
Dispute 
Settlement
All core obligations of the agreement, 
including labor and environmental 
provisions, are subject to the dispute 
settlement provisions of the Agreement.
An innovative enforcement mechanism 
includes monetary penalties to enforce 
commercial, labor, and environmental 
obligations of the trade agreement.
All core obligations of the agreement, including 
labor and environmental provisions, are subject 
to the dispute settlement provisions of the 
agreement. 
 
The agreement includes strong enforcement 
mechanisms, including the ability to suspend 
trade concessions or establish monetary 
assessments. 
Other provisions
Government procurement provisions: 
requires that covered Chilean ministries, 
regional and municipal governments 
not discriminate against US firms, or 
in favor of Chilean firms, when making 
government purchases in excess of agreed 
monetary thresholds.
Imposes strong and transparent 
disciplines on procurement procedures, 
such as requiring advanced public notice of 
purchases, as well as timely and effective 
bid review procedures.
Government procurement provisions: the 
agreement includes disciplines on the purchases 
of most Moroccan central government agencies, 
as well as the vast majority of Moroccan regional 
and municipal governments. 
 
US and Moroccan suppliers will have increased 
certainty due to strong and transparent 
disciplines on procurement procedures, such as 
requiring advance public notice of purchases, 
as well as timely and effective bid review 
procedures. 
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Labor and Environmental Provisions: 
environmental obligations are part of 
the core text of the trade agreement. U.S. 
professionals will be able to enter Chile 
without a numerical limit.
Activities to Promote Workers Rights: 
both parties reaffirm their obligations 
as members of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), and shall strive 
to ensure that their domestic laws 
provide for labor standards consistent 
with internationally recognized labor 
principles. The agreement makes it clear 
that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce 
domestic labor protections to encourage 
trade or investment.
Commitments and Cooperation to Protect the 
Environment – each government will require 
the effective enforcement of its own domestic 
environmental laws, and this obligation is 
enforceable through the agreement’s dispute 
settlement procedures. 
 
Each government commits to establish high 
levels of environmental protection, and to not 
weaken or reduce environmental laws to attract 
trade or investment. 
The agreement also promotes a comprehensive 
approach to environmental protection. 
Procedural guarantees that ensure fair, 
equitable and transparent proceedings 
for the administration and enforcement 
of environmental laws are combined with 
provisions that promote voluntary, market-based 
mechanisms to protect the environment. 
 
Cooperative Activities to Promote Worker 
Rights: the agreement reaffirms the obligations 
of members in the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and commits to strive to 
ensure that its domestic laws provide for labor 
standards consistent with internationally 
recognized labor principles. 
The agreement makes it clear that it is 
inappropriate to weaken or reduce domestic 
labor protections to encourage trade or 
investment. 
Each government will be required to effectively 
enforce its own domestic labor laws, and 
this obligation is enforceable through the 
agreement’s dispute settlement procedures. 
Procedural guarantees in the agreement require 
each government to provide access for workers 
and employers to fair, equitable and transparent 
labor tribunals or courts.
Parties 
involved
Canada and Mexico 
Name of the 
Agreement
NAFTA – North America Free Trade Agreement






All non-tariff measures affecting agricultural trade between the US and Mexico were eliminated on 1st January 
1994. These barriers, including Mexico’s import licensing system (which had been the largest single barrier to US 
agricultural sales) were converted to either tariff-rate quotas or ordinary tariffs.
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All agricultural tariffs between Mexico and the United States were immediately eliminated and others were to be 
phased out over transition periods of 5, 10, or 15 years. The immediate tariff eliminations applied to a broad range of 
agricultural products. In fact, more than half the value of agricultural trade became duty free when the agreement 
went into effect. Tariff reductions between the United States and Canada had already been implemented under the 
CFTA. Both Mexico and the United States protected their import-sensitive sectors with longer transition periods, 
tariff-rate quotas, and, for certain products, special safeguard provisions. NAFTA also provides for rules of origin to 
ensure that maximum benefits accrue only to those items produced in North America.
In addition to a transition period of up to 15 years for certain products, NAFTA utilized special safeguards to 
protect import-sensitive crops. For example, NAFTA liberalized trade with Mexico in all products. Initially, Mexican 
exporters were granted a small duty-free quota for TRQ products in the U.S. market. A relatively high tariff is 
charged for any sales over that amount. The duty-free quota grew at a 3-percent compounded annual rate over 
NAFTA’s transition period, while the over-quota tariff was gradually phased out. The phase-out period was 10 years 
for dairy products, cotton, and sugar-containing products and 15 years for peanuts. NAFTA side agreements also 
contain special provisions for sugar and frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ).
U.S. and Mexican tariffs on sugar are to be phased out in conjunction with treatment of US and Mexican border 
protection on sugar. During the first 6 years, the US reduced its second-tier tariffs on sugar imports from Mexico 
by 15 percent, while Mexico aligned its tariff regime with that of the United States. Under the NAFTA formula, from 
the 7th through the 14th year of the agreement, a ceiling of 250,000 tons was placed on Mexico’s sugar exports 
to the United States. Mexico will be determined to be a net surplus producer when production of sugar exceeds 
consumption of sweeteners.
The United States has a tariff-rate quota for FCOJ that gives Mexico annual access for 40 million gallons at a 
reduced tariff rate, and a higher (normal trade relations) tariff rate for over-quota volumes. There will be no growth 
in the quota volume over the 15-year transition period. The over-quota tariff, however, declined by 15 percent during 
the first 6 years, remained constant from the 7th through the 10th year, and is being phased out over the remaining 
5-year period. A price-based safeguard also comes into effect when specified quantity triggers are reached.
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures The NAFTA imposes disciplines on the development, adoption, and 
enforcement of SPS measures. These are measures taken to protect human, animal, plant life or health from risks 
that may arise from animal or plant pests or diseases, or from food additives or contaminants. 
Disciplines contained in NAFTA are designed to prevent the use of SPS measures as disguised restrictions on trade, 
while still safeguarding each country’s right to protect consumers from unsafe products, or to protect domestic 
crops and livestock from the introduction of imported pests and diseases.
Although NAFTA encourages trading partners to adopt international and regional standards, the agreement 
explicitly recognizes each country’s right to determine the necessary level of protection. Such flexibility permits 
each country to set more stringent standards, as long as they are scientifically based. NAFTA also allows state and 
local governments to enact standards more stringent than those adopted at the national level, so long as these 
standards are scientifically defensible and are administered in a forthright, expeditious manner.
 
Export Subsidies The United States and Canada will be allowed to provide export subsidies into the Mexican market 
to counter subsidized exports from other countries. Neither Canada nor the United States is allowed to use direct 
export subsidies for agricultural products being sold to the other, and both countries are required to consider the 
export interests of the other whenever subsidizing agricultural exports to third countries.
Internal Support Under NAFTA, the parties should endeavour to move toward domestic support policies that 
have minimal trade or production distorting effects, or toward policies exempt from domestic support reduction 
commitments under the World Trade Organization.
 
Grade and Quality Standards: The United States and Mexico agreed that when either country applies a measure 
regarding the classification, grading, or marketing of a domestic product destined for processing, it will provide no 
less favourable treatment for like products imported for processing.
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* Information available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_fi le490_8547.pdf
Rules of Origin NAFTA improves incentives for buying within the North American region and ensures that North 
American producers receive the primary benefits of all newly established tariff preferences. Goods not originating 
from the United States, Mexico, or Canada must be significantly transformed or processed in one of those countries 
before they receive NAFTA’s lower duties for shipment to one of the two other countries. The NAFTA rules of origin 
for agricultural products were constructed to prevent Mexico from becoming an export platform for processed 
products made from subsidized raw materials originating in non-NAFTA countries. There are also strong rules of 
origin for U.S. import-sensitive commodities, such as citrus and dairy items.
 
Bulk Commodities: All bulk agricultural commodities, and certain processed products such as orange juice and 
cheese, are exempt from the de minimis provision, which otherwise allows up to 7 percent of non-NAFTA-origin 
product to be included in final NAFTA goods. Citrus All single-fruit juices (fresh, frozen, concentrated, reconstituted, 
fortified) must be made from 100-percent NAFTA-origin fresh citrus fruit. The de minimis provision does not apply 
to any citrus products. Dairy Products: Only US or Mexican milk or milk products can be used to make cream, 
butter, cheese, yogurt, ice cream, or milk-based drinks traded under NAFTA preferential rates. Vegetable Oils With 
the exception of certain industrial fatty acids and acid oils, refining of crude oils within a NAFTA country does not 
confer NAFTA origin. Making margarine and hydrogenated oils from imported crude oils does not confer origin. 
Sugar Refining does not confer origin. In order for sugar to be considered of North American origin, all processing 
of sugarcane or sugar beets must take place in NAFTA territory. Peanut Products Mexico must produce the peanuts 
to qualify for NAFTA preferential rates on peanuts and peanut products exported to the United States. U.S. exports 
of peanut products to Mexico are subject to this same rule.
The NAFTA Committee on Agricultural Trade monitors and promotes cooperation on the implementation and 
administration of the agricultural provisions. The committee provides a forum for the three countries to consult 
regularly on trade issues and other matters related to the implementation of the agreement.
 
The NAFTA Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures promotes the harmonization and equivalence 
of SPS measures, and facilitates technical cooperation, including consultations regarding disputes involving SPS 
measures. This committee meets periodically to review and resolve issues in the SPS area.
 
The NAFTA Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agricultural Goods provides 
recommendations to the three governments for resolving private commercial disputes that arise in connection 
with transactions in agricultural products. The intent is to achieve prompt and effective resolution of commercial 
disputes, with special attention to perishable items. The committee is composed primarily of private sector 
representatives but also has government participants.
Yet to enter into Force 
Parties involved* Peru Colombia Panama Republic of Korea
Name of 
Agreement




US-Panama FTA US-Korea FTA
Date of sign of 
the Agreement
December 2005. Entry into force 
is foreseen for 1 January 2009. 
Nov 2006 (negotiations 
were terminated in Feb 
2006).





More than two-thirds of current 
U.S. farm exports to Peru will 
become duty-free immediately. 
Tariffs on most remaining U.S. 
farm products will be phased out 
within 15 years, with all tariffs 
eliminated in 17 years. 
The United States and Peru 
have worked to resolve sanitary 
and phytosanitary barriers to 
agricultural trade, including on 
food safety inspection procedures 
for beef, pork, and poultry.
Colombia will 
progressively eliminate 
customs duties on 
originated goods as 
agree in the schedules
The United States and 
Colombia have worked 
to resolve sanitary and 
phytosanitary barriers 
to agricultural trade, 
including on food safety 
inspection procedures 
for beef, pork, and 
poultry. 
More than half of 
US farm exports 
to Panama will 
become duty free 
immediately;
Tariffs on most 
remaining US 
farm products 
will be phased out 
within 15 years; 
Parties agreed to exclude 
rice on their concession 
lists.
South Korea will maintain 
current tariffs on 
oranges, beans, powdered 
milk and other imported 
agricultural products.
South Korea will maintain 
safeguard measures and a 
tariff rate quota (TRQ) on 
such goods as pork, beef 
and other agricultural 
products.
Both sides agree to 
establish a body that 
deals with the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
issues. But they agree 
to carry out scientific 
assessment of any SPS-
related risks and carry 
out technical consultation 
before the body gets 
involved in the issues
Trade in goods
Eighty percent of U.S. exports 
of consumer and industrial 
products to Peru will be duty-
free immediately upon entry 
into force of the agreement, and 
the remaining tariffs will be 
eliminated within ten years. 
Key U.S. exports, such as 
agriculture and construction 
equipment, auto parts, information 
technology, equipment, medical 
and scientific equipment, and 
forest products will gain immediate 
duty-free access to Peru. 
Peru will join the WTO’s 
Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), which removes 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
information technology products. 
Under the Andean Trade Preference 
Act (ATPA), many products from 
Peru already enter the United 
States duty-free. The agreement 
will make duty-free treatment 
permanent, providing certainty 
for businesses and investors, and 
will allow nearly all non-textile 
consumer and industrial products 
made in Peru to enter the U.S. 
duty free immediately upon 
implementation of the agreement.
Over eighty percent of 
U.S. exports of consumer 
and industrial products 
to Colombia will become 
duty-free immediately, 
with remaining tariffs 
phased out over 10 years. 
Key US exports will gain 
immediate duty-free 
access to Colombia. 
Colombia agreed to allow 
trade in remanufactured 
goods, and will join 
the WTO Information 
Technology Agreement. 
Textiles and apparel 
will be duty-free and 
quota-free immediately 
if the products meet 
the agreement’s rule of 
origin. 
Over 88 percent 
of U.S. exports 
of consumer and 
industrial goods 




to be phased out 





for key US 
sectors. 
Apparel products 
made in Panama 
will be duty-
free under the 
agreement if 





fabric and yarn 
exports and 
Both sides agree to 
abolish about 94 percent 
of tariffs on commodities 
within three years after 
the FTA goes into effect, 
and scrap all tariffs on 
traded goods over time.
In the case of 
automobiles, the US will 
immediately abolish 
tariffs on passenger cars 
with an engine capacity 
of below 3,000 cc and 
auto parts. Tariffs on 
automobiles with an 
engine displacement of 
3,000 cc or more will be 
abolished in three years.
In return, South Korea 
will overhaul its auto-
related tax scheme under 
which a flat special excise 
tax of 5 percent is levied 
on automobiles. South 
Korea will also streamline 
its auto-related taxation 
scheme.
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Textiles and apparel will be duty-
free and quota-free immediately if 
the products meet the agreement’s 
rule of origin.
Rules of origin are generally based 
on the yarn forward standard.
A “de minimis” provision will 
allow limited amounts of specified 
third-country content to go into 
U.S. and Peruvian apparel, giving 
producers in both countries 
needed flexibility. 
A special textile safeguard will 
provide for temporary tariff relief, 
if imports under the Agreement 
prove to be damaging to domestic 
producers. 
The United States will 
immediately abolish 
61 percent of tariffs on 
textiles and garments in 
terms of its import value, 
and exclude South Korea’s 
major textile export items 
such as men’s shirts and 
women’s jackets from 
the yarn-forward rule of 
origin.
Trade in Services
Peru will accord substantial 
market access across its entire 
service regime , subject to very 
few exceptions, using the so called 
“negative list approach” 
Key services sectors covered 
by the Agreement include 
audiovisual, express delivery, 
telecommunications, computer 
and related services, distribution, 
and construction and engineering. 
Further liberalization of bank, 
Insurance, Security and Related 
services. 
Colombia will accord 
substantial market 
access across their 




Colombia agreed to 
eliminate measures that 
require US firms to hire 
national rather than US 
professionals and phase-
out market restrictions 
in cable television. 
Users of Colombian 
telecom networks are 
guaranteed reasonable 
and non discriminatory 
access to the network. 
This prevents local firms 
from having preferential 
or “first right” of access 
to telecom networks.
 
US phone companies 
obtained the right 
to interconnect with 
Colombian dominant 
suppliers’ fixed networks 
at nondiscriminatory 













retail trade to 
Panamanian 
nationals, and to 









South Korea will not open 
public services such as 
education and medical 
care. However, it will 
push to open accounting, 
law and broadcasting 
services in a phased 
manner. Restrictions on 
Hollywood movies will 
be maintained, requiring 
local theaters to run 
domestic movies for at 
least 73 days a year.
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Investment
The agreement establishes a legal 
framework for US investors in 
Peru and contains a commitments 
to develop an appellate 
mechanism for investor-state 
disputes.
The agreement 
establishes a stable 
legal framework for US 
investors operating in 
Colombia. 
 
All forms of investment 
are protected under the 
agreement. US investors 
will enjoy in almost all 
circumstances the right 
to establish, acquire, 
and operate investments 
in Colombia in an 
equal footing with local 
investors. 
Investor protections 















US investors will 
enjoy in almost 
all circumstances 




Panama on an 










South Korea will 
maintain regulations 
that bar foreign 
investors from owning 
more than 49 percent 
of the country’s major 
telecommunications 
firms that provide core 
networks and services
IPRs
The agreement provides 
standards for the protection and 
enforcement of a broad range 
of intellectual property rights, 
which are consistent with both 
US standards of protection and 
enforcement, and with emerging 
international standards. 
The agreement provides 
for improved standards 
in the protection and 
enforcement of a broad 
range of intellectual 
property rights, which 
are consistent with 
both US standards 
of protection and 







standards for the 
protection and 
enforcement of 





both US standards 





South Korea will not 
guarantee the minimum 
price of new US drugs. 
Seoul will introduce a 
system that calls for 
assessing the violation of 
patents when it reviews 
applications by local drug 
makers for the sale of 
copied drugs
The two sides agree to 
extend their copyright 
protection period from 
50 to 70 years after the 
author’s death, but the 
agreement will go into 
effect two years after 





The agreement’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms call for 
open public hearings, public 
access to documents, and the 
opportunity for third parties to 
submit views. 
The Agreement includes strong 
enforcement mechanisms, 
including the ability to suspend 
trade concessions or establish 
monetary assessments.
The agreement’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms 
call for open public 
hearings, public access 
to documents, and the 
opportunity for third 
parties to submit views. 
The Agreement includes 
strong enforcement 
mechanisms, including 
the ability to suspend 







calls for open 
public hearings, 
public access to 
documents, and 
the opportunity 
for third parties 










Parties involved Date of initiation Comments 
Thailand October 2003
During two rounds of FTA negotiations between the United States and Thailand in 
2004 and four rounds in 2005, good progress was made on the text of all chapters 
of the FTA, although significant work continues.
CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement)
Parties involved 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic
US-Dominican Republic-CAFTA
Signed August 5, 2004.
Sectors
Trade in Agriculture
More than half of current US farm exports to Central America and the Dominican Republic will become duty-
free immediately. 
Tariffs on most US farm products will be phased out within 15 years, with all tariffs eliminated in 20 years.
The US will work with Central America and the Dominican Republic to resolve sanitary and phytosanitary barriers 
to agricultural trade, especially in relation to problems in food inspection procedures for meat and poultry.
Trade in Goods
Eighty percent of US exports of consumer and industrial goods will become duty-free in Central America and 
Dominican Republic immediately with remaining tariffs phased out over 10 years.
Key US export sectors will benefit from immediate duty elimination.
Duties on autos and auto parts will be phased out within five years.
Apparel made in Central America will be duty-free and quota-free is made with US or regional fabric and yarn.
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* US-Israel Free Trade Agreement (in force), US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (in force), US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (in force) 
US-Bahrain FTA: signed September 2004, entry into force in 2006, US-Oman FTA: negotiations concluded September 2006, US-UAE 
FTA: launched negotiations March 2005.
**  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Trade in Services
Central America and the Dominica Republic will accord substantial market access across the entire services 
regime, offering new access in sectors such as telecommunications, tourism, energy, transport, and construction.
Central American countries and the Dominican Republic have agreed to change “dealer protection regimes” 
and loosen restrictions that lock US firms into exclusive or inefficient distributor arrangements.
Investment
The agreement establishes a secure, predictable legal framework for US investors in Central America and 
the Dominican Republic, and contains a commitment to develop an appellate mechanism for investor-state 
disputes.
Dispute Settlement
The agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism call for open public hearings, public access to documents, 
and the opportunity for third parties to submit views. The agreement also contains strong anti-bribery 
commitments, including criminalization of bribery.
Not fi nalized or suspended
Name of the Agreement Starting of negotiations Objectives 
FTAA (The Free Trade Area 
of the Americas)
November 1994
This agreement was suspended 
in November 2003 in Miami. 
MERCOSUR countries made official 
their non availability to negotiate 
in Argentina in the Presidential 
meeting in Mar de Plata. 
The FTAA is a proposed agreement to eliminate or reduce 
trade barriers among all nations in the American continents 
(except Cuba, Venezuela and later Bolivia and Nicaragua, 
which entered the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
in response). In the latest round of negotiations, officials of 
34 nations met in Miami, on November 16, 2003 to discuss 
the proposal. The proposed agreement was an extension of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
Canada, Mexico and the United States.
MEFTA (Middle-East Free 
Trade Agreement)
May 2003
Increase trade and investment between the United States and 
Middle East countries.
Deepen economic ties will be create through Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs), and comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs)*, and will enhance the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) program for eligible countries.
ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations )**
October 2002
This initiative envisages bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) 
between the United States and ASEAN countries that are 
committed to economic reforms and openness. The goal is to 
create a network of bilateral FTAs, which will increase trade 
and investment.
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* Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
SACU* (Southern African 
Custom Union) 
June 2, 2003
By moving from one-way trade preferences to full partnership 
through a reciprocal free trade agreement, the U.S. and 
SACU want to expand market access, further link trade to 
southern Africa’s economic development strategies, encourage 
greater foreign investment, and promote regional economic 
integration and growth. The FTA will cover not only tariffs, 
but also establish new disciplines on trade related issues, 
including services, investment, government procurement, 
electronic commerce, labor and the environment. It will help 
to level the playing field in areas where US exporters are 
disadvantaged by the European Union’s free trade agreement 
with South Africa, and to engage SACU countries as partners 
in multilateral market-opening initiatives through the WTO.
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Annex 3
A Brief Account of GATT/WTO 
Rules and Procedures on RTAs
ARTICLE XXIV OF THE GATT AND THE ENABLING 
WTO provisions governing Members’ participation in customs unions, free-trade areas (FTAs), and 
interim agreements are contained in paragraphs 4-11 of GATT Article XXIV. During the Uruguay Round, a 
number of provisions contained in the original Article XXIV, drafted in 1947, were clarified or interpreted, 
as contained in paragraphs 1-12 of the 1994 Understanding.
Rules with respect to reciprocal (tariff and non-tariff) preferential arrangements on trade in goods 
among developing countries are found in paragraphs 1, 2(c), 3(a & b) and 4 of the Enabling Clause.
GATS Article V lays down the rules governing economic integration agreements in the area of trade 
in services, including those implemented in stages.
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 WTO Members are required to notify the RTAs they conclude.
 «Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agree-
ment … shall promptly notify …» [GATT Article XXIV:7(a)]
 «Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement … shall: (a) notify …» [Paragraph 
4(a) of the Enabling Clause]
 «Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall promptly notify …» 
[GATS Article V:7(a)]
PROVISION OF INFORMATION
Members are required to submit information on their agreements:
 «Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agree-
ment … shall make available to [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] such information regarding the pro-
posed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting 
parties as they may deem appropriate.» [GATT Article XXIV:7(a)]
46
* This was the standard text in the terms of reference of GATT working parties.
** Today, similar language is found in the standard terms of reference for the examination of individual RTAs notifi ed under GATT 
1994.
 «Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement … shall: (a) … furnish [the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES] with all the information they may deem appropriate relating to such action.» 
[Paragraph 4(a) of the Enabling Clause]
 «Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 … shall also make available 
to the Council [for Trade in Services] such relevant information as may be requested by it.» [GATS 
Article V:7(a)]
These legal texts do not characterize what the information to be provided to the WTO by RTA partici-
pant Members should encompass.
PERIODIC REPORTING
Periodic reporting on the operation of customs unions and FTAs was introduced by the GATT Council 
in 1971. During several years thereafter, reports of varying comprehensiveness were submitted and con-
sidered by the Council, though generally not attracting much attention. The 1994 Understanding, in para-
graph 11, reiterates the obligation of providing such biennial reports. However, no existing record details 
the objectives pursued in 1971, and no further explanation was provided in the 1994 Understanding.
MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE 
RTAs notified to the WTO are subject to surveillance in various Bodies, at various levels of depth and 
complexity, depending upon which provision the notifying Member avails itself of:
• No GATT 1947 provision did textually refer to any kind of "examination" or "review" of notified 
RTAs. As noted above, Article XXIV:7(a) foresees that members will need information «to make 
such reports an recommendations … as they may deem appropriate», and requires RTA parties to 
make such information available to them. A practice has been developed of mandating a working 
party to «examine in the light of the relevant provisions of the GATT» each RTA notified under 
Article XXIV, and to «report thereon».* In the WTO context, paragraph 7 of the 1994 Understand-
ing clarified that all RTAs notified under GATT Article XXIV shall be «examined … in light of the 
relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and paragraph 1 of this understanding» and that a report shall 
be submitted to the CTG with «findings in this regard».** The 1994 understanding also restated 
a neglected GATT procedure relating to the periodic reporting on the operation of RTAs covered 
under Article XXIV. 
• The Enabling Clause (paragraph 4(b)) envisions the possibility of bilateral or multilateral consul-
tations in the case of RTAs among developing countries in the area of trade in goods.
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* This is also refl ected in the corresponding terms of reference for the examination.
• As to RTAs in the area of trade in services, the wording of GATS Article V:7(a) makes it clear that, 
whenever so decided by the Council for Trade in Services (CTS), an individual EIA will undergo 
examination with the aim «to report … on its consistency» with GATS Article V.*
RTA EXAMINATION PROCEDURES UNDER THE GATT
For RTA seeking legal cover under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947, the process consisted of the follow-
ing steps:
• The notification of an agreement (of which the text was also made available) was considered by the 
Council, which delegated the examination to a working party and invited contracting parties to ask 
written inquiries to the respective parties. The responses to such inquiries should also be written.
• Once a formal document is produced with all these questions and responses, the working party 
should began its work.
• Working party meetings (usually with the participation of party experts from capitals) com-
prised a further exchange of questions and replies, political statements and legal comments. 
Sometimes, the parties submitted further information in writing (usually, statistics). This infor-
mation was in some cases reproduced in a formal document.
• The working party's report on the examination, once agreed upon, was transmitted to the Coun-
cil, for adoption.
The process was confidential, internal to the working party, except for the documents produced and 
the agreed report. There were no recorded minutes of the debates. Interested contracting parties had to 
request membership in each working party; in general, only a few contracting parties (and usually the 
same) were active in RTA-related working parties.
Within those common procedures, each working party decided on its own respective method of work 
The format of working party reports reflected those differences: some favoured a more descriptive ap-
proach of the work done, mixing factual information and judgments on consistency, while others had a 
more structured approach in line with Article XXIV provisions/requirements. Although, in most cases, 
working party conclusions merely recorded divergent views on the assessment of the RTA’s full compat-
ibility with the rules (usually by summarizing elements detailed in previous sections), these could take 
up a single paragraph or a whole section.
CURRENT RTA EXAMINATION PROCEDURES
Today, the process through which RTAs are dealt with after its notification and distribution of its text 
has changed, partly because of developments in WTO rules and partly as a consequence of the creation of 
the CRTA and the procedures developed therein:
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* In the case of services agreements and those notifi ed under the Enabling Clause, examination is not automatic but should be de-
cided by Members. To date, decision to submit RTAs to examination was taken for all EIAs notifi ed and already considered by the 
CTS, and for a single RTA notifi ed under the Enabling Clause.
• The notification of an agreement (together with its text) is considered by the CTG (if notified 
under GATT Article XXIV), the CTS (if notified under GATS Article V) or the Committee on Trade 
and Development, if notified under the Enabling Clause). If examination of the agreement is 
needed, the relevant body adopts the terms of reference for the examination and transfers the 
examination task to the CRTA.*
• The parties to the RTA are invited to submit preliminary information on the agreement in the 
form of a Standard Format, which is published as a formal document. This is the initial step of 
what is called the “factual” examination.
• During (at least one or two) CRTA regular sessions, there is an exchange of oral questions and 
replies on the examined RTA, as well as more general statements by the parties and other Mem-
bers. Detailed minutes are produced in each meeting devoted to the RTA examination, and pub-
lished as formal documents.
• Between each of those meetings, usually a round of additional written questions and answers 
takes place. These are also published as a formal document.
• Once the CRTA feels that the factual part of the examination has concluded, the Secretariat is 
requested to draft a report on the examination, as the basis for consultations among members 
(in open-ended informal CRTA meetings).
• The consensual CRTA report on a given agreement would then be sent to the WTO body which 
requested the examination, for adoption.
Information supplied by the parties, as well as questions and replies answers exchanged among 
members in writing are issued as official, restricted WTO documents and, later, derestricted. The same 
applies to proceedings of formal examination debates, where members are identified in their interven-
tions. The CRTA formal sessions are open to members and observers, and consultations on draft reports 
are held as informal CRTA meetings (open to all members).
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